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n the fall of 2001, an outbreak of the
virulent disease called "inhalation
anthrax" spread around the country
through the mails, prompting widespread
concern about the availability of antibiotics
to treat it. A.G. Bayer Pharmaceuticals manufactured the principal drug of choice- the
patented antibiotic CIPRO (ciproflaxacin).
The company faced intense pressure to let
other drug manufacturers produce generic
versions of CIPRO to minimize hoarding,
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alleviate anticipated shortages of the medication, and to reduce its escalating cost. In
Canada, the government met the public
health challenge by exercising an emergency
provision of its patent law rules, which
brought the company's Canadian patent
monopoly to an end. Bayer strenuously
opposed the Canadian action however. In
the United States, the company, with two
years remaining on its seventeen-year patent
monopoly, stood upon its legal right to leave
prices high and supplies less than abundant.
Substitute medications were available, a
spokesman said, and patent protection existed
as a necessary reward for having invested in
the development of a superior product.
These different approaches in the U.S. and
Canada illustrate the different political balance that has been struck between consumer
and patent rights in the two nations. The
difference has seldom been more apparent;
but the problem of determining an effective
and appropriate inducement for innovation
is centuries old. The Venetian Senate, in fact,
granted a ten-year blanket of protection for
"new and ingenious devices" as early as the
sixteenth century. During the Renaissance,
monarchs used the award of patents to try
to hasten the improvement of agricultural
methods and military technology. Concepts
related to the copyright, which permitted the

authors of literary works to benefit from
their authorship through a limited monopoly
on rights of publication, emerged during the
Enlightenment.
Patenting inventions and protecting creative
works was accordingly well-known to the
American colonial legislatures. They established
a diversity of patent rules that both confused
and hindered inventors (Merges, 1992). When
the Framers addressed the subject of patents
in the United States Constitution, they consolidated the power to create and regulate
patents in the hands of the federal government. The Constitution provides in Article I,
section eight, that that "The Congress shall
have the power ... to promote the progress
of useful arts, by securing for limited times
... to inventors, the exclusive rights to their
discoveries." The basic principle guiding the
development of patent law has in succeeding
years been that, to qualify for a patent, an
invention must be novel, useful, and not
obvious. The volume of patents granted
continues to rise, with the number of patents
issued by the Patent Office coming to
157,497 in 1999.
Patent law in the United States changed
significantly in 1994 when the United States
decided to adhere to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). This agreement mandated several changes to American
law to bring it into harmony with the new
global standard. Up to this point, the patent
laws of the United States provided seventeen
years for protection, ordinarily running from
the day the patent was issued. Under the
GATT agreement, however, the new time
allowed by patent protection is a variable
period that can run up to twenty years,
counting from when the application is first
filed with the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") (Lemley, 1995).
Specialists have conducted theoretical and
empirical studies of the patent system and its
legal regime-industry by industry and doctrine by doctrine-to see whether inventors'
rights have been overprotected. They have
often inquired, that is, whether patents foster
anti-competitive monopolies and raise prices
without generating sufficient compensatory

benefits. The tests applied by patent officers
and courts, and the studies by scholars,
however, often assess whether the rules, or
the patents granted under them, are economically efficient rather than whether they are
deleterious to particular groups of consumers
or to consumers as a general class. To claim,
as its defenders do, that the "public interest"
is generally served in the long run by patent
law may or may not be correct; but this is
not the same as asserting that consumer
interests are generally well-served.
Whether consumer interests have been
given their due regard by the patent law
regime is a different inquiry from the ones
that are usually undertaken by scholars who
are not consumer professionals, and, unsurprisingly, it is an inquiry to which further
attention should be paid. Do consumers
benefit, overall, from American patent laws?
Are the economic rewards from innovation
sufficient to outweigh the damage done by
officially sanctioned monopoly power? Will
consumers profit from the new rules that
have been crafted, in the interest of globalization, for extended patents? The topic is a
broad and complicated one, and only a
beginning can be attempted here.

RATIONALIZING PATENT PROTECTION
There is a consumer interest served by granting
patents of limited duration. Patents have the
capacity to stimulate free market competition
by increasing the consumer options through
various new inventions and ideas. Because
patentees must publicly disclose their inventions to obtain patents, the system encourages
other inventors to design around or develop
their own improvements. Consumers then
are presented with an array of new and
improved inventions, as has happened recently
in such fields as pharmaceuticals, computer
science, and biotechnology. Without the
patent right, inventors would likely be
induced by self-interest to rely on trade secret
protection that would typically keep new
information permanently from the public.
Two general reasons have been offered for
the existing government system of patents,
which protects and nurtures investment in
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An imbalance
between anemic
antitrust enforcement and strong
intellectual property
protection may
be producing a
significant anti
consumer impact.

inventions for such a long period.
First, inventiveness promotes economic
well being, but it does not thrive without inventors who can reasonably anticipate the prospect of monetary gain (and
investors who can reasonably anticipate
gain} as the result of their success.
Without protective rules and penalties for
violating those rules, anyone could copy any
commercially successful new idea or item
before the recoupment of the costs of invention, including a reasonable bounty for the
successful act of creation. Rational competitors would seize the opportunity to
capitalize on the investments made by
others, discouraging the inclination to
sponsor invention.
Second, governmental macroeconomic
policy objectives are said to be served by
the patent law. One specific policy claim,
for example, is that lengthy patent
protection protects small businesses
from predation by larger businesses.
A new idea, product or process is
the often only way that the smaller
business can compete with the larger,
more dominate, businesses. Our
patent laws are said to protect and foster
the growth of small businesses by allowing
them to compete against the larger businesses
without fear that their sole advantage will be
prematurely upended.
More generally, the American patent
system, it is said, creates a positive incentive
for investment in research, which sustains
international economic competitiveness over
extended time periods. Patent law, like monetary or fiscal policy, is said to be a public
policy tool that either promotes or restricts
national economic growth according to the
economic incentives it generates.
(Symposium, 1990).

CALCULATING THE COSTS
OF ANTI·COMPETITIVENESS
Notwithstanding the benefits of a system of
long-term patent protection, the costs of that
protection may be borne disproportionately by
consumers. The biggest costs will result from
the officially sanctioned monopoly power that
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is generated by the grant of a patent. Evidence
of an aggregate anti-competitive impact of
patents is difficult to come by. It is not difficult, however, to locate individual allegations
of the detrimental impact of monopoly
power by consulting court decisions in the
area of patent antitrust law.
Unless more aggressive antitrust enforcement becomes the norm, it appears that the
impact of the intellectual property and patent
laws on innovation, price structures and the
availability of products will continue to be
damaging. Robert Pitofsky, the Chairman of
the Federal Trade Commission, recently suggested that an imbalance between anemic
antitrust enforcement and strong intellectual
property protection may be producing a significant anti-consumer impact. "It is clear
that both intellectual property protection
and reasonable antitrust enforcement will
encourage innovation," Pitofsky wrote.
"Intellectual property rights subsidize investments in innovation [while] Antitrust ...
prevents dominant firms from harming or
retarding innovation. Serious problems arise
when either regime- intellectual property
protection or antitrust-is accorded disproportionate weight." Examining the history
of antitrust enforcement, Pitofsky observed
that it had "often if not always been [excessively] sensitive to the value of innovation."
(Pitofsky, 2001 ).
A striking example of over-sensitivity to
the possibility of discouraging innovation is
the Federal Circuit decision in CSU v. Xerox
Corporation, where the court concluded that
a patent holder could refuse to license anyone,
regardless of the intent of the patent holder
or the effect of the refusal on competition.
The court ruled that the refusal was exempt
from the antitrust laws in all but extreme
circumstances. In doing so, the court "leaped
from the undeniable premise that an intellectual property holder does not have to license
anyone in the first instance to the unjustifiable
conclusion that it can select among licensees
to achieve an anti-competitive purpose or
can condition a license ... to achieve an
anti-competitive effect." (Pitofsky, 2001).

]!;:,
QUESTIONING THE LENGTH OF PATENT
PROTECTION
Are inventors being protected for unnecessarily
long periods of time at the expense of consumers? In the United States rights have been
lengthened to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the claimed invention for
twenty years after the filing date of the
patent application. Extensions to compensate
for litigation subsequent to filing are also
possible, particularly in biomedical fields.
Faced with a choice between the conferring
monopoly power for a longer period of time
or opening previously monopolized lines of
manufacture to the competitive marketplace,
it would seem appropriate to place a strong
burden on the advocates for longer periods
to demonstrate that returns are otherwise
insufficient to induce investment. In the fields
of electronic technology, computer science, and
biomedical research, the evidence suggests
that the value of investments is great enough
to generate, if anything, over-investment.'
Representatives of several industries have
claimed that their protections have been
adversely affected by the WTO Trade Related
Aspects of International Property Rights, or
"TRIPS" agreements, which they claim have
effectively reduced patent protection. In the
biomedical field, lobbyists have complained
that developing nations are being permitted
to copy patented medicines under public
health exceptions. They also claim that since
they spend more time on average litigating for
their patents, and since the date of application
rather than the date of the grant may trigger
the patent clock, they have less protection
under the new system notwithstanding the
change from a seventeen to a twenty-year
grant.
At least one study suggests that there is
less to the argument about shortening than
meets the eye. Overall, empirical analysis by
Professor Mark Lemley found that the average patentee obtained an extra 253 days of
protection under the new law when compared to the older system of 17 years. Part of
the reason is the new law's permissive filing
of "provisional" applications. These allow
inventors to file such applications with the

Patents and Trademarks Office
(PTO) in order to have the date
e
of the provisional application
count as the invention's priority
hr-.::.
date in disputes with other
inventors but to avoid running
~
clock on the patent protection p·.·
period for another year. In
essence, mventors can obtain
extra time for their patents
at minimal cost. (Lemley,
1995)
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Once patent rights are
commercialized they are
_
subject to misuse by
patentees to further unlawful monopolies
to impede competition. One method consists
of illegally tying a patented product to a second, non-patented product. Another method
is to retard competition by pursuing the
right to claim infringement against a competitor who makes "insubstantial" changes to an
invention. Sometimes patentees enter into
ostensibly "cooperative" agreements, negotiated under threat of patent litigation, which
have the effect of extending the duration of
their patents and maintaining an artificially
high price level for a product line.
Patentees also have refused to share information about unpatented aspects of their
products in order to limit competition, which
might otherwise produce further innovation
that could benefit the public while diminishing
the value of the original grant. In a widely
noted antitrust enforcement action, for
example, the Federal Trade Commission in
1998 charged the Intel Corporation with
denying essential technical information and
product samples of new microprocessors to
companies that, because of intellectual
property disputes, had initiated or threatened
to initiate litigation against Intel or Intel's
customers. Intel's goal, the FTC asserted,
was to coerce other companies not to resort to
the courts, but instead to license their intellectual property on terms favorable to Intel.
The Commission alleged that anti-competitive
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where the opportunity for consumer partic-

ipation in the process is absent. (Oczek).

effects included discouraging innovation
efforts by potential challengers in microprocessor technology. (Pitofsky, 2001).

CONSTRAINTS ON THE ARTICULATION OF
CONSUMER INTERESTS
As stated earlier, there is a burden on the
applicant for a patent to establish several
elements, including originality and usefulness,
to receive a patent. For good reasons, there is
no requirement for the applicant to prove
that an invention will advance the consumer
interest. And yet is hard for the authors to see
why the process cannot be designed systematically to incorporate greater consideration
of consumer concerns:
• Consider a hypothetical decision to grant a
patent for the successful invention of a sterile,
disease-resistant plant. Foreseeable gains in
utility for some agricultural producers and
suppliers would result from patenting such
an invention, and these will be highlighted
by the party seeking the patent in the course
of demonstrating suitability for an awardbut matters of great concern such as the
likelihood of higher prices, or of reduced
quantities available for consumption, may
be detrimental and yet in the current process
are likely to remain undisclosed or underdisclosed. While patent examiners have considerable authority to request information
regarding a patent, the proceeding is typically
a non-adversarial administrative procedure,
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• Consider a hypothetical decision to
grant a patent to a pharmaceutical company for a new drug, which predominantly is the result of a governmental
research program, in which the company cooperated but did not participate
in actively. The grant of the patent to
the company would further the government's interest in promoting the
future partnering with the drug
industry; but the resulting monopoly on production would dramatically increase the cost
of the drug and the value to consumers will
be attenuated at best. Consumers generally
do not have standing to challenge the award
of a patent. (Naik, Davis).
• Consider the fact that there is no doctrine
of "fair use" in patent law comparable to the
doctrine in copyright law, which allows limited
use of material to further the development of
new ideas which make unsubstantial use of
patented processes. (O'Rourke).
• Finally, consider the potential value of
allowing consumers or agencies representing
them to challenge patent holders for failing to
develop or license their patents at reasonable
cost- a right which has been narrowed by
case law and is nonexistent for consumers.
(Naik, Davis).

CONCLUSION
The old saying that war is too important to
be left to generals can be applied to patent
law, which has too profound an impact on
consumers to be only the domain of patent
law specialists. Redrawing some of the rules,
notably the basic protection period which has
been set to harmonize with global standards,
now appears to be "off the table." If consumer groups and consumer educators will
more systematically address the specific
problems involved, however, the current lines
between patent monopoly power and competition may be redrawn.
The authors hope that this discussion

stimulates further research by consumer
affairs professionals into methods for
improving the responsiveness of the system
of patent and intellectual property protection
to consumer interests.
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